Stochastic dominance (SD) is commonly used to rank income distribution and assess social policies. The literature argues that SD is a robust criterion for policy evaluation because it requires minimal knowledge of the social welfare function. We argue that, on the contrary, SD is not a robust criterion. We do this by carefully introducing microfoundations into a model by Chu and Koo (1990) who use SD to provide support to family-planning programs aiming at reducing the fertility of the poor. We show that fertility restrictions are generally detrimental for both individual and social welfare in spite of the fact that SD holds. Our findings are an application of the Lucas' Critique. 
Introduction
A classical literature on the measurement of inequality claims that stochastic dominance provides a robust criterion to rank income distributions. This literature originated in papers by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) , and was extended by Dasgupta et al. (1973) , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) , Saposnik (1981 Saposnik ( , 1983 , and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b ) among many. 1 As summarized by Foster and Shorrocks (1988a) , …rst order stochastic dominance (FSD) "can be regarded as the welfare ordering that corresponds to unanimous agreement among all monotonic utilitarian functions." As such, FSD seemingly provides a robust criterion for policy evaluation because it only requires minimal knowledge of the social welfare function. A natural prescription of this literature would be to look for policies that improve the distribution of incomes in the FSD sense.
An important application of stochastic dominance is the one by Chu and Koo (1990) (CK henceforth). They use FSD to evaluate the consequences of changing the reproduction rate of a particular income group. Using a Markovian branching framework with di¤erential fertility among income groups, they show that an exogenous reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a sequence of income distributions that conditionally …rst-degree stochastically dominate (CFSD) the original distribution. CFSD implies FSD. CK argue that stochastic dominance "provides us with very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning programs that encourage the poor in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate (pp. 1136)." Numerical simulations of CK's model further con…rm that more general fertility reduction programs that disproportionately targets lower income groups, such as the One Child Policy, or policies that promote fertility of high income groups, should increase social welfare. 2 These policies generally result in a sequence of income distributions that dominates 1 A more complete list of references can be found in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) . A more precise terminology is "welfare dominance" as used by Foster and Shorrocks (1988b) . We use stochastic dominance because this is the term used in the paper that is the focus of our critique. 2 On policies seeking to increase the fertility of high income groups, the New York Times reports about the Chinese policy of "upgrading" the quality of their population in order to increase its international competitiveness. It suggests an strategy that includes stigmatizing unmarried women older than 28, who are typically highly educated, as "leftover" women. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/global/chinasleftover-women.html? Last accessed 3/15/2013 the distribution without the program in the …rst order stochastic sense.
CK's results are nevertheless puzzling. Basic economic principles suggest that absent externalities or market failures individuals' decisions should be e¢ cient. In fact, various authors have shown that fertility choices made by altruistic parents, i.e. parents who care about the number and welfare of their children, are socially optimal under certain conditions. Early papers in this category include Pazner and Razin (1980) , Willis (1985) , Becker (1983) , Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) . Recent work by Golosov et al. (2007) further shows that market allocations are Pareto optimal in a variety of models of endogenous fertility. These …ndings suggest that family planning programs aiming at reducing the fertility of the poor do not necessarily have the strong theoretical support claimed by CK. Lam (1993 Lam ( , pp 1043 ) expresses similar skepticism.
Unfortunately CK do not fully spell out the decision problem of individuals, a common feature of the literature cited in the …rst paragraph. However their two main assumptions, grounded on empirical evidence, are in fact hard to rationalize by frictionless models of fertility. First, they assume intergenerational mobility across income and consumption groups but complete market models, such as the Barro-Becker model, predict no mobility. 3 Second, they assume that fertility decreases with individual income, a feature that is also di¢ cult to rationalize by e¢ cient models of fertility (see Cordoba and Ripoll, 2010) . It is possible that behind these two assumptions there are some implicit frictions explaining why fertility is suboptimal in CK's model and intervention is welfare enhancing. This paper revisits the question of optimality of family planning programs as envisioned by CK but explicitly taking into consideration the household decision problem. For this purpose we use a version of the Becker (1988, 1989 ) model enriched to study issues of income distribution. Individuals in our model di¤er in their innate abilities, are altruistic toward their descendants, and choose their own fertility optimally. Abilities are random, determined at birth and correlated with parental abilities. Insurance markets are available but parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children. Due to the assumed market incompleteness, mobility arises in equilibrium and fertility di¤ers across ability groups.
The equilibrium of the model satis…es the two assumptions postulated by CK. First, fertility decreases with ability in the presence of uncertainty about children's abilities. To the extent of our knowledge, this result is novel and of independent interest by itself. Although there is a literature documenting and studying a negative relationship between fertility and ability, obtaining such negative relationship within a fully dynamic altruistic model with uncertainty is novel. 4 The negative relationship arises from the interplay of two opposites forces. On the one hand, higher ability individuals face a larger opportunity cost of having children due to the time cost of raising children. On the other hand, higher ability individuals enjoy a larger bene…t of having children when abilities are intergenerationally persistent. We …nd that the e¤ect of ability on the marginal cost dominates its e¤ect on the marginal bene…t if the intergenerational persistence of abilities is not perfect. This explains why fertility decreases with ability. Second, the equilibrium of the model exhibits mobility. In particular, the equilibrium is characterized by a Markov branching process satisfying the Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity property. This requirement means that if a kid from a poor family and a kid from a rich family both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more likely that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid.
Given that the equilibrium of our model satis…es the assumptions postulated by CK, direct application of their Theorem 2 implies that a reduction in the fertility of the poor generates a sequence of income distributions that dominates the original distribution in all periods in the …rst order stochastic sense. In particular, average income and consumption increase for all periods. This result comes from two forces. First, average ability of (born) individuals increases because the poor have proportionally more low ability children as a result of the assumed conditional stochastic monotonicity property. Second, consumption and income of the poor strictly increases because they spend less time and resources raising children. However, contrary to CK's claim, we …nd that individual and social welfare fall.
Our main result, Proposition 8 shows that fertility restrictions of any type, not only for the poor, unequivocally reduce individual and social welfare in our model, in spite of the strong degree of market incompleteness. Hence we conclude that stochastic dominance alone is not a sound criterion to rank social welfare as claimed by Chu and Koo in particular, and by a larger literature in general.
The primary reason why stochastic dominance fails to rank welfare properly is because it does not take into account the fact that indirect utility functions are not invariant to the policies in place. As we show, a policy that restricts fertility in our model reduces the set of feasible choices and invariably reduces welfare of all individuals in all generations, even those whose fertility is not directly a¤ected. This is because altruistic parents care not only about their own consumption and fertility but also care about the consumption and fertility of all their descendants. Furthermore, the welfare of those individuals who are not born under the new policy also falls, or at least does not increase. Social welfare falls because the welfare of all individuals, born and unborn, either falls or remain the same. This is the case, for example, if social welfare is de…ned as classical (Bentham) utilitarianism, a weighted sum of the welfare of all present and future individuals. The result also holds for versions of classical utilitarianism that are consistent with the Barro-Becker concept of diminishing altruism. An interpretation of our results is that the positive e¤ect on welfare of fertility restrictions, namely higher average consumption, is dominated by the negative e¤ect of an smaller dynasty size.
CK de…ne social welfare as average (Mills) utilitarianism rather than classical utilitarianism. Under this de…nition, social welfare can increase even if the welfare of all individuals falls if population falls even more. The net e¤ect of fertility restrictions on social welfare depends in this case on the relative strength of two opposite forces. On the one hand, the distribution of abilities and incomes improves for all periods, as stressed by CK. On the other hand, the welfare of all individuals fall. Propositions 9 and 10 provide two examples in which the later force dominates and social welfare, de…ned as average welfare, falls not only in present value but also for all periods. These are counterexamples to the claim that stochastic dominance is a su¢ cient condition to rank social welfare, even when welfare is de…ned as average utilitarianism. We further provide a variety of numerical simulations to illustrate that our results are general, not just extreme examples.
Our results challenge the policy implications of CK's paper but also the broader literature, mentioned in the …rst paragraph, claiming that stochastic dominance alone provide robust normative implications. We show that carefully modeling the microfoundations of the problem makes a di¤erence and can reverse the conclusions obtained by simple stochastic dominance criteria. Our …ndings are an application of the Lucas'critique. CK's results are based on the assumption that reduced form parameters and indirect utility functions are invariant to policy changes. Speci…cally, the fertility rate as well as the indirect utility functions of individuals are assumed to be invariant the policies in place. However these are not structural parameters but function of deeper parameters, those governing preferences, technologies and policies in place. Policy evaluations based on the assumed constancy of the parameters may be misleading. In his classic critique, Lucas argued that the observed negative relationship between unemployment and in ‡ation cannot actually be exploited by policymakers to systematically reduce unemployment. The analogous argument in our context is that the observed negative relationship between fertility and income cannot be exploited by policymakers to improve social welfare.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our paper is related to Alvarez (1999) . He studies an economy with idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and endogenous fertility choices by altruistic parents. Our endowment economy is a version of his model, one with nonnegative bequest constraints. In equilibrium no individual leaves positive bequests. This is a stronger degree of market incompleteness than that in Alvarez and it explains why mobility arises in the equilibrium of our model but not in his. As a result, our model maps exactly into CK's Markovian model. There is a related literature that studies fertility policies in general equilibrium model. A recent example is Liao (2013) who studies the One Child Policy in a model with human capital accumulation and she arrives similar conclusions. Our paper is complementary to hers. Our framework is simpler in that we study an endowment economy but richer in the heterogeneity and its ability to generate mobility. This allow us to study in detail the dynamics of the income distribution and the soundness of stochastic dominance concepts to rank social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the basic connection between fertility, distribution of income and social welfare in models with exogenous fertility.
The section reviews the result of CK and provides further analysis. Section 3 endogenizes fertility and shows that fertility generally decreases with ability and income. Section 4 studies social policies. It shows the basic limitation of CK's assumptions and argues that fertility policies typically reduces social welfare. Numerical simulations and robustness checks are performed in this section. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Distribution and Social Welfare with Exogenous Fertility
Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals who live for one period.
Individuals di¤er in their labor endowments, or earning abilities. Let f! 1 ; ! 2 ; :::; ! n g be the set of possible abilities, where 0 < ! 1 < ::: < ! n : The technology of production is linear in ability: one unit of labor produces one unit of perishable output. In this section, the income of an individual is equal to his/her ability. Let f (!) be the fertility rate of an individual with ability !: It satis…es the following assumption.
is decreasing in ability.
Abilities
Ability is determined at birth and correlated with the ability of the parent. Ability is drawn from the Markov chain M where M ij = Pr(! child = ! i j! parent = ! j ) for ! i and ! j 2 : As in CK, assume that M satis…es the following condition:
Assumption 2. Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity (CSM):
:::
Assumption 2 means that if a poor kid and a rich kid both fall into one of the poorest classes, it is more likely that the poor kid will be poorer than the rich kid. Assumption 2 assures intergenerational persistence of abilities: higher ability parents are more likely to have higher ability children. CSM implies …rst order stochastic dominance. To see this notice that when J = n the condition becomes:
Two We further assume that M has a unique invariant distribution, , where satis…es:
Fertility and the distribution of abilities
Let P t (!) be the size of population with ability ! at time t = 0; 1; 2; :::, and P t X !2
be total population at time t: The initial distribution of population,
; is given. Assuming that a law of large number holds, the size of population in a particular income group evolves according to:
Let t (!) P t (!) /P t be the fraction of population with ability ! 2 at time t: Since income is equal to ability, also characterizes the income distribution of the economy. The law of motion of is given by:
As shown by CK, the limit is well de…ned.
A central topic of the paper is to characterize t and as well as their relationship to fertility. The following proposition provides a simple but important benchmark. The …rst part states that when fertility is identical across types the limit distribution of incomes is equal to ; the invariant distribution associated to M . This result provides a baseline distribution in absence of fertility di¤erences. In that case, the distribution of income just re ‡ects the genetic distribution of abilities, what can be termed nature rather than nurture.
The second part of the Proposition shows that fertility di¤erences alone does not necessarily a¤ect the long-run distribution of income, . In particular, fertility di¤erences are irrelevant for the income distribution when abilities are i.i.d. All proof are in the Appendix. Proposition 1. When equals : Suppose one of the following two assumptions hold:
Fertility di¤erences a¤ect the distribution of incomes when abilities are persistent. The following Proposition is an application of CK's Theorem 2. It states that if the fertility of the poor is higher than the fertility of the rest of the population then is di¤erent from ;
and moreover, dominates in the …rst order stochastic sense.
Proof. See Chu and Koo (1990, pp.1136).
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that a reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a limit distribution that dominates the original distribution. More generally, CK
show that if fertility decreases with income and the initial distribution of incomes is at its steady state level, 0 (! i ) ; then a reduction in the fertility of the poor results in a sequence of income distributions that …rst order stochastically dominates 0 (! i ), that is,
for all 1 I n and t > 0.
Social Welfare
CK consider average utilitarian welfare functions of the form:
where U (!) is the utility of an individual with ability ! and p (t) is the weight of generation t in social welfare. A particular case emphasized by CK is one where the planner cares only about steady state welfare: p (t) = 0 for all t and lim t!1 p (t) = 1. In that case,
The following corollary of Proposition 2 provides the theoretical support to family planning programs for the poor, as claimed by CK. Corollary 3 holds because reducing fertility of the poor improves the observed distribution of abilities but does not alter U ( ). In the next two sections we show counterexamples to Corollary 3 when fertility is endogenous. As a preview of the results, we show a case in which fertility is restricted by policy, the distribution of incomes does not change in any period but social welfare as well as individual welfare decreases for all individuals in all periods compared to the unrestricted case. The reason why the previous Corollary fails to account for this possibility is that it presumes that U (!) is invariant to policies, it lacks microfoundations. However, U (!) is in fact an indirect utility function and therefore it is not invariant to policies.
An Economic Model of Fertility
We now consider the endogenous determination of fertility. Assumptions are the same as in the previous section. In particular, the initial distribution of population across abilities,
; is given, abilities are random, determined at birth and described by a Markov chain M satisfying Assumption 1, and having a unique invariant distribution, : The technology of production is linear in labor: one unit of labor produces one unit of perishable output. Let ! t = [! 0 ; ! 1 ; :::; ! t ] 2 t+1 denote a particular realization of ability history up to time t, for a particular family line. There is neither capital nor aggregate risk.
Individual and aggregate constraints
Markets open every period. The resources of an individual of ability ! t at time t are labor income and transfers from their parents. Labor income equals ! t (1 f t ) where is the time cost of raising a child. Let b t (! t ) denote transfers, or bequests, received from parents.
Resources are used to consume and to leave bequests to children. Insurance market exists as parents can leave bequest contingent on the ability of their children. Let q t (! t ; ! t+1 ; ) be price of an asset that delivers one unit of consumption to a child of ability ! t+1 given that the history up to time t is ! t . 5 The budget constraint of an individual at time t with history ! t is:
We assume that parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children:
; ! i 2 and all t > 0:
Since output is perishable, aggregate consumption must be equal to aggregate production.
Alternatively, aggregate savings must be zero. Savings are equal to the total amount of bequests left by parents. Since bequests are non-negative then aggregate savings are zero if and only if all bequests are zero. Therefore, in any equilibrium the budget constraints (5) simpli…es to:
This is balanced budget constraint for every period and state. The lack of intergenerational transfers signi…cantly simpli…es the problem and explain why social mobility arises in the equilibrium. Otherwise, as shown by Alvarez (1999) , parents will use family size to bu¤er against shocks and use transfers to smooth consumption across time and states regardless of ability preventing thus any social mobility. Absent transfers, ability becomes the key determinant of consumption and fertility, as we see below.
In addition to budget constraints, individuals must satisfy time constraints. In particular, the time spent in raising children cannot exceed the time available to an individual, which is 5 The price also depends on the aggregate distribution of abilities at time t.
normalized to 1. Thus,
Individual' s Problem
The lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is of the Barro-Becker type (Barro and
Becker 1989 and Becker and Barro 1988):
where u (c) = c ; 2 (0; 1) ; is the utility from consumption, f t is the number of children, U t+1
is the utility of the time t + 1 generation, and E t is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information up to time t. The term f 1 t is the weight that parents place on their f t children. When = 0 parents are perfectly altruistic toward children. We assume
The following restrictions on parameters are needed in order to have a well-behaved bounded problem. The …rst part of the assumption is identical to the one discussed by Barro and Becker (1988) to assure strict concavity of the problem. The second part guarantees bounded utility as the e¤ective discount factor in that case satis…es f
The individual's problem is to choose a sequence f t ! t 1 t=0 to maximize U 0 subject to (6) and (7). The problem can be written in sequence form, by recursively using (8) , to obtain:
6 An upper bound for Ut is u(!n) 1 1 : subject to 0 P t+1 ! t 1 ; ! t P t ! t 1 = for all ! t 1 2 t , ! t 2 and t 0; P 0 > 0:
In this formulation,
f j ! j . Fertility rates can be recovered
An alternative way to describe the household problem is by the following functional equation:
The next proposition states that the principle of optimality holds for this problem. This result is novel because the functional equation is not standard due to the endogeneity of fertility. In particular the discount factor is endogenous. Alvarez (1999) shows that the principle of optimality holds for a dynastic version of this problem, while we show that it holds for the household version of the problem. 7 Our household problem is simpler because of the lack of intergenerational transfers in equilibrium. 7 The analogous dynastic problem is:
In this problem the number of family members is a state variable, N , all member have the same ability, !; and make the same choices. The household problem does not impose these constraints.
Optimal Fertility
The optimality condition for an interior fertility choice is: 8
Let f = f (!) be the optimal fertility rule and c = c It is instructive to write the …rst order condition in an alternative way. First, use equation (11) to express (10) as:
Then use (12) to rewrite (11) as:
This equation is useful because it only requires marginal utilities, rather than total utility as in equation (11), and corresponds to the Euler Equation of the problem describing the optimal 8 Corner solutions are not optimal due to the properties of utility functions and altruistic function. Having no children is never optimal because the marginal bene…t of a child is in…nite while the marginal cost is …nite. In particular, notice that E [U (! 0 ) j!] > 0 for all ! while lim f !0 f = 1: Having the maximum number of children is also sub-optimal because the marginal cost is in…nite when parental consumption is zero. consumption rule. Although savings are zero in equilibrium, fertility allows individuals to smooth consumption across generations. 9 To better understand the implications of the model it is useful to consider some speci…c cases. The following Proposition consider three cases: i.i.d abilities across generations, perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities with no uncertainty and random walk (log) abilities 10 Proposition 5. Persistence and the fertility-ability relationship. 
where A is a constant. Furthermore, fertility is independent of ability in one of the following two cases: (ii) M is the identity matrix (abilities are perfectly persistent and deterministic); or (iii) ln ! t = ln ! t 1 + " t where
According to Proposition 5, fertility decreases with ability when abilities are i.i.d. The intuition is that without intergenerational persistence, the ability of the parent only a¤ects her/his marginal cost but not her/his marginal bene…t as
On the other extreme, fertility is independent of ability when abilities are perfectly persistent across generations (cases ii and iii). This is because in those cases both the marginal cost and the marginal bene…t are proportional to ! .
Given that fertility becomes only independent of ability in the extreme case of perfect persistent, it is natural to conjecture that fertility decreases with ability when persistence is less than perfect. We were able to con…rm this conjecture numerically but analytical solutions were not obtained. 9 Equation (11) can also be written in the form of a more traditional Euler Equation. Let 1 + r 0 be the gross return of "investing" in a child. It is given by 1 + r
is the value of a new life, in terms of goods, while ! is the cost of creating a new individual. Then (11) can be written as:
This is an Euler Equation with a discount factor (1 ) f : It suggests that optimal fertility choices are similar to saving decisions and that children are like an asset, as pointed out by Alvarez (1999) . However, two important di¤erences with the traditional Euler Equation are that the individual controls both the discount factor and the gross return.
1 0 Although a random walk does not satisfy some of the assumptions above, it helps to develop some intuition.
Dynamics of the Income Distribution
Given the optimal fertility rule f ( ), initial distribution 0 ( ) of population across abilities, and initial population P 0 , distributions of income for all periods can be obtained using equations (1) and (2) . Furthermore, average earning abilities and average income are given by:
In the next section we use the microfounded model to perform welfare evaluations of family planing programs. The model also allows us to assess whether Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are somewhat associated. They are. A mobility matrix with less than perfect persistence of intergenerational abilities can give rise to a negative relationship between fertility and ability.
The following Proposition revisits Proposition 1 at the light of the micro-founded model. It plays an important role in section 4 when providing counter-examples to CK's claims. In words, if abilities are i.i.d. across generations, then fertility decreases with ability but the observed limit distribution of abilities is independent of fertility choices and equal to (!). Furthermore, with certainty and perfect intergenerational persistence of abilities the observed distribution of abilities in any period is identical to the initial distribution of abilities. Finally, if (log) abilities follow a random walk then there is not limit distribution of abilities since its variance goes to in…nite.
Fertility Policies and Individual Welfare
Consider now a family planning policy that sets lower and/or upper bounds on fertility choices. Let f (!) 0 and f (!) 1= be the lower and upper bound respectively. Bounds potentially depend on individual abilities. The indirect utility U r (!) of the constrained problem is described by the following Bellman equation:
Let f r (!) denotes the optimal fertility rule. The following Proposition is one of the main results of the paper. It states that binding fertility restrictions in at least one state reduces the indirect utility, or welfare, of all individuals even those whose fertility is not directly a¤ected. The Proposition also states that fertility restrictions of any type (weakly) reduces the fertility of all individuals except perhaps those whose fertility rates are at or below the lower bound.
Fertility restrictions reduce welfare because it restricts individuals'choices without providing any compensation. Furthermore, fertility restrictions that only a¤ects a particular group, say the lowest ability individuals, results in lower welfare for all individuals because, regardless of current ability, there is a positive probability that a descendant of the dynasty will fall into the group directly a¤ected in …nite time. Proposition 7 implies that policies such as the One Child Policy, which imposes a uniform bound on all ability levels, or policies that compel individuals to increase their fertility, such as the "leftover" women stigma in China, are detrimental to individual welfare, according to our model. Given that welfare of all individuals falls, the marginal bene…ts of having children also falls while the marginal cost remains the same. As a result, fertility must fall for all types except perhaps for those who are constrained by the policy to increase their fertility. We next study the consequences of fertility restrictions on social welfare.
Family Planning and Social Welfare Reconsidered
Given that fertility policies reduces the welfare of all individuals, as stated in Proposition 7, it is natural to infer that social welfare should also fall. The answer, however, depends on how social welfare is de…ned and whether the policy reduces or increases population. In this section we focus on fertility policies that impose upper limits on fertility rates such as limiting the fertility of the poor or the One Child Policy.
Analytical results
According to Proposition 7, upper limits on the fertility of any ability group reduces fertility of all ability groups. Therefore, upper limits on fertility unequivocally reduces population of all ability groups at all times after time 0. Given that both population and individual welfare fall for all ability types, we are able to show that fertility limits unequivocally decrease social welfare if social welfare is of the classical, or Bentham, utilitarian form. Classical utilitarianism de…nes social welfare as the total discounted welfare of all (born) individuals: 11
In this formulation p (t) 0 is the weight the social planner assigns to generation t. Since individuals are altruistic toward their descendants, p (t) > 0 means that the planner gives additional weight to generation t on top of what is implied by parental altruism. A particular case in which the planner weights only the original generation, and therefore adopts its altruistic weights, is the one with p (0) = 1 and p (t) = 0 for t > 0 :
The following Proposition states the main conclusion of the paper: restricting fertility decreases classical utilitarian welfare.
Proposition 8. Imposing upper limits on fertility choices reduces social welfare as de…ned by (16) .
An identical result is obtained if the planner exhibits positive but diminishing returns to population, say if P t (!) in expression (16) Then upper limits on fertility choices reduce social welfare as de…ned by (3).
Proposition 9 relies on the earlier …nding in Proposition 1 that, when abilities are i.i.d, the distribution of abilities among the population is independent of fertility choices and the limit distribution of ability is the invariant distribution of M . We show in the appendix The following is a deterministic example showing that average utilitarian welfare unequivocally falls with "uniform" fertility restrictions such as the one child policy.
Proposition 10. Suppose M is the identity matrix and f (!) = f . Then fertility restrictions reduces social welfare as de…ned by (3).
Proposition 10 provides another example in which fertility restriction do not a¤ect :
Since in the deterministic case all ability groups have the same fertility choices, and the fertility restriction a¤ect all ability groups equally, then it follows that t = 0 for all t so that the e¤ect of the policy on social welfare is only determined by the e¤ect on individual welfare U .
We now turn to numerical simulations to investigate more generally the e¤ects of fertility policies on social welfare.
Calibration and Simulations

Benchmark calibration
The following parameters are needed to simulate the model: the Markov process of abilities M , preference parameter ; altruistic parameters and , cost of raising children ; and 
This chain does not satisfy conditional stochastic monotonicity property although its diagonal elements dominate other elements implying certain level of earning persistency across generations. We also consider the Markov chain provided by CK, which satis…es CSM, and obtain similar results. Initial population is normalized to 1. The initial distribution of abilities, 0 ; is approximated by the stationary distribution implied by M and ! f .
Our altruistic function, f 1 , is calibrated following Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) (MS henceforth). 12 For we initially used MS's parameter of 0:38. However, the fertility rates implied by the calibrated model were too high and the range of fertilities too small compared to Brazilian fertility data. We set = 0:68 to better …t the fertility data. Another key parameter of the model is the time cost of raising a child, . We choose = 0:2 which implies a maximum number of 10 children per couple, or that each parent spend 10% of their time on every child. We perform robustness checks for this and other parameters. For the social planner weights we assume p (t) = t with = 0:1: The set of parameters used for the benchmark exercises are summarized in 
Results
The simulated model reproduces a negative relationship between fertility and ability similar to the Brazilian data. 13 Because abilities are persistent but not perfectly persistent across generations, the increase of the marginal cost of children dominates that of the marginal bene…t as ability increases. As shown in the …rst panel of Figure 1 , fertility per household falls from 9 to 2 as earning abilities increase from 1 to 12. The second panel plots average ability, !; and average income; y; as the upper bound of fertility increases. As predicted by CK, tighter fertility limits, which a¤ect lower income groups more severely, increase average income and ability.
The remaining panels in Figure 1 illustrate the e¤ect of fertility limits on various welfare measures. On the horizontal axis is the uniform fertility upper limit imposed on all ability groups, a limit that goes from 0 to 10 children per household. It shows that steady state average welfare, W , average welfare of all generations, W ( p ), welfare of the initial generation, W 0 ; and total welfare of all generations, W ( p ) ; all increase as the upper bound on fertility is relaxed. These results con…rm the main message of the paper: fertility restrictions, on the poor or other groups, do not have strong theoretical support for improving people's welfare.
We also study the welfare e¤ects of imposing lower bounds on fertility rates. This type of restrictions disproportionately a¤ect the rich, or high ability individuals, because their unconstrained fertility is typically lower. Figure 2 shows that this policy increases average ability since high ability individuals have proportionally more high ability children. On the other hand, the policy reduces average income because individuals, especially those with high ability, spend more time raising children and this e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of an improved ability distribution. All four welfare measures unanimously decrease as the lower bound on fertility increases.
In summary, the results above show that fertility restrictions, on the poor and on the rich, does not result into higher social welfare although they may improve the distribution of abilities and income.
Robustness Checks
We now report the results of various robustness checks. For this purpose we change one parameter at a time while keeping all the other parameters at their benchmark values and study the e¤ect on the various welfare measures of imposing an upper limit on fertility. We …nd that the qualitative results obtained above are mostly robust although there exists a set of parameters for which average steady state welfare, W ; improves with fertility restrictions.
The set of parameters studied is further restricted by the need to have …nite utility.
The results are robust to setting below 0:74. If is larger than 0.74, relaxing fertility restrictions slightly reduce steady state average welfare, W ; but only when there is a tight upper limit on fertility, of between 1 and 2, as illustrated in the …rst panel of Figure We also …nd that if is su¢ ciently low, a tighter fertility restriction may increase W as illustrated in the second panel of Figure 3 for the case = 0:2. A low means that parents care little about future generations, have fewer kids, higher consumption and lower marginal utility of consumption. In this case, fertility restrictions have a minor e¤ect on individual welfare and, as a result, the change of the ability distribution is the dominant e¤ect determining social welfare. However, this low degree of altruism also implies that the model predicts counterfactually low fertility rates. A similar result is obtained when is particularly large, as illustrated in the third panel of Figure 3 for = 0:53.
Finally, if the cost of raising children, ; is su¢ ciently large then a tighter fertility restriction may increase W as shown in the last panel of Figure 3 for the case = 0:28. In this case the high cost of raising children itself prevents households from having many children and therefore fertility restrictions are not very harmful for individual welfare. The change in social welfare is therefore primarily determined by the change in the distribution of abilities.
Conclusion
Stochastic dominance, or welfare dominance, seemingly provides a robust criterion for policy evaluation. It allows to rank policies by simply looking at the resulting income distribution without requiring much knowledge of individuals'preferences and constraints, or knowledge of the social welfare function. Cho and Koo (1990) exploit such apparent generality to provide a striking policy recommendation. They assert that stochastic dominance "provides us with very strong theoretical support in favor of family-planning programs that encourage the poor in developing countries to reduce their reproductive rate (pp 1136)." Such fundamental claim has surprisingly remained unchallenged. In this paper we show that stochastic dominance alone does not provide the strong theoretical support claimed by CK. Our …ndings challenges not only CK's main normative conclusion but also the larger classical literature on the topic of welfare dominance which is the foundation of such conclusion.
Our main contribution is to provide explicit micro-foundations to CK's model. The key features are altruism, random abilities, labor costs of raising children, non-negative bequest constraints, and an endowment economy. The model is particularly useful because its equilibrium exactly maps into the Markov branching framework of CK. It also successfully replicates two basic features of the evidence on fertility and income distribution: fertility decreases with ability and social mobility occurs in equilibrium. These features are not easily obtained by altruistic models of fertility.
We show that fertility restrictions reduces social welfare in our model in spite of the fact that they may result in superior income distributions in the …rst order stochastic sense.
Contrary to CK, and to a larger literature mentioned in the introduction, we …nd that …rst order stochastic dominance does not provide a strong theoretical support to family-planning programs directed toward reducing the fertility of the poor. The main reason for this failure is that stochastic dominance does not account for the fact that indirect utility functions are not invariant to fertility policies.
Our model abstracts from a number of aspects that are potentially important to fertility decisions such as bequests, human capital accumulation, and wealth inequality. We study these extensions in Cordoba el al. (2013) . The models are signi…cantly more complicated, and do not map into a simple Markov branching framework, but our early results con…rm the …ndings that policies restricting fertility typically does not increase social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i)
If fertility is exogenously the same for every individual, divide both sides of (1) by P t+1 .
Using the de…nition of t ,
The last equality holds because
f t (! i ) = P t f
Taking limit to both sides of the expression with , we get
Hence ( ) = ( ) is the invariant distribution of M:
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) M ( ; ! i ) is independent of ! i implies M (! j ; ! i ) = M (! j ) for every ! j 2 : By (1),
Taking limit to both sides, ( ) = lim t!1 t ( ) is equal to the invariant distribution.
Proof of Proposition 4
We …rst show that there exists a solution U ( ) that solves the functional equation (10) . De…ne a set of functions.
where M = u(!n) 1 1 , and k k is the sup norm. We can show that S is a complete metric space. De…ne operator T as
for all ! 2 and U 2 S. First show that T is a contraction. It su¢ ces to show that T satis…es two properties, monotonicity and discounting. Suppose the sequential problem has a unique solution, then the right hand side of (18) The existence of a solution U ( ) has been proved, we next show U (!) = U 0 (!) for all
are the choice variables in the sequential problem (9) . Since the current population P t ! t 1 is given, the problem is the same if we choose f t ! t 1 t=0 instead of P t+1 ! t 1
t=0
, and it can be written as follows. Given ! i , the welfare of an individual in generation i is U i (! i ) = max ! t 2 and equation (13) simpli…es to:
The left hand side of equation (19) is strictly increasing in f while the right hand side is strictly decreasing in f . Obviously f > 0. An interior solution with f < 1= exists since 1 > .
Proof of Proposition 5 (iii) Let f denotes the optimal fertility given !. Plug functional form of u ( ) into equation (12) U (!) = h (f ) !
where
We make a guess on the value function and let it take the form: U (!) = A! where A is a constant, independent of !: Equating this guess with (20) results in:
Thus, in order for A to be independent of !; we must verify that the results f is independent of !: Notice that,
The last equality holds because the assumption that ! 0 is lognormal distributed with ln ! and " as the mean and variance of ln ! 0 : Plug this equality into (11) to obtain:
(1 f ) 1 ! = A (1 ) f e ! cancels out of this equation and therefore f is independent of ! con…rming our guess.
This expression together with (21) and (22) gives a rule to solve the optimal fertility f .
(1 f )
1
(1 ) f e prove part (ii), we can apply Proposition 5 (ii), in which fertility is independent of ability when M is identity. We use this result to prove the distribution of every period as well as the limit distribution is the same with the initial one.
t+1 (! j ) =
The last equality holds because M is an identity matrix. So t (!) = 0 (!) for all ! and all t: By taking limit we have (!) = 0 (!). Part (iii) follows Proposition 5 (iii). The conditional variance of ln ! t diverges to in…nite because ln ! t = ln ! 0 + t 1
E (ln ! t j! 0 ) = ln ! 0 ; V ar (ln ! t j! 0 ) = t 2 2 and lim t!1 V ar (ln ! t j! 0 ) = 1:
